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In recent years the field of corporate governance has been characterized by an increasing 
effort to gain a better understanding of the impact of board characteristics on the financial 
performance of a firm (Dalton, et al., 1998; Sueyoshi, et al., 2010; Velte, 2010). Whilst some 
studies reported inconclusive findings (Larcker, et al., 2007), the majority of studies found 
empirical evidence supporting the idea that variables in the field of corporate governance 
influence a firm’s profitability (Ezzamel, et al., 1993; Dehaene, et al., 2001; Iyengar, et al., 
2009; O'Connell, et al., 2010). By implication, the notion that board design and attributes 
variously impact on a firm’s financial performance is agreed upon. 
However, while informative and managerially relevant, this literature remains 
dominated by an emphasis on a specific system of corporate governance, i.e. the one-tier 
system. Yet, only very little is known about the relationship between corporate governance 
factors and performance in the two-tier system. Yet, extant research indicates that the 
differences in terms of board structure and governance mechanisms, may affect the 
attributes and characteristics of effective corporate governance modes, which may differ 
extensively between the two. The most predominant difference consists in the clear 
separation of control and management in the dualistic system (Jungmann, 2006). This 
suggests that more research is needed in order to shed light on the extent to which our 
current knowledge also applies to boards in the dualistic system. 
Accordingly, this study’s objective is to analyze exclusively two-tier system settings 
and the relationship between boards and firm performance by investigating board designs 
and configurations. After reviewing the literature in this field, we investigate the 
fundamental characteristics of supervisory boards in a dualistic system, with focus on how to 
increase their effectiveness.  
Our study projects several contributions to literature. First, we offer to enrich the 
current debate about the effectiveness of supervisory boards by measuring the interaction 
of board work and firm performance, which constitutes a key question in the discussion 
about how corporate governance influences a firm’s performance viewed from the micro-
perspective of the supervisory board. Second, we continue to build upon the small but 
growing literature on boards in the two-tier system, which is trying to illustrate both, the 
differences and similarities to the one-tier system, especially on the level of composition, 
work flow routines, decision making, as well as social and institutional ties. Third, our study 
illustrates why setting the research in a two-tier system is particularly suitable in this context 
and why in general certain board characteristics can be measured more exactly in a two-tier 
system than in a one-tier system. Finally, by simultaneously considering multiple variables of 
board effectiveness, rather than focusing on a single dimension, we create a broader view 
on their interaction and firm performance influence, taking into account how formal 
organizational structure can moderate the effect.  
 
IDENTIFICATION OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
Investigating the impact of corporate governance on firm performance is usually undertaken 
by including various dimensions, focusing on specific board characteristics. These 
characteristics represent criteria or input parameters for the design of effective and robust 
corporate governance architectures. Board characteristics define distinctive attributes that 
are embodied by members of a board and provide a specifiable criterion to differentiate the 
board as a uniquely compound group of individuals. A commonly utilized example is for 
instance board diversity as a measure for how much boards differ internally in terms of 
members’ background characteristics. Determining the effect of these board characteristics 
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on firm performance mostly takes a contingency approach, as relations are highly depending 
on situational limitations. Reviewing the existing literature in this context reveals five board 
characteristics which have been thoroughly analyzed in prior research and shall be 
presented in the following.    
Diversity  
In order for firms to stay competitive, they have to rapidly and flexibly adapt to changes in 
their environment (Bettis, et al., 1995; Tuggle, et al., 2010). Thus, boards, as the most 
important internal monitoring and control device, play a crucial role (Daily, et al., 2003). 
Research from various disciplines on adaptability, creativity and decision-making suggests 
that board diversity could possibly facilitate this function in a changing environment. 
However, its detailed effect on key performance indicators is still subject to wide dispute 
among researchers (Golden, et al., 2001). Diversity in this context, is used to define the 
degree to which members of a group differ in terms of certain background characteristics 
(Pelled, et al., 1999; Bunderson, et al., 2002; Cannella, et al., 2008). When aiming for the 
optimal level of diversity within boards, one has to consider a natural tradeoff, which is very 
well explained by Kosnic 1990: if the level of diversity is too high among board members it 
tends to impede interaction and efficient communication. If, however, the level of diversity 
is too low, negative implications for corporate governance might occur due to groupthink 
and complacency (Kosnik, 1990). Moreover, diversity has to be regarded as a 
multidimensional concept, comprising various background characteristics at once. 
Geographical factors, gender, board demography and cognitive factors are among the most 
frequented parameter to be found in related studies (Finkelstein, et al., 1990; Pearce, et al., 
1992; Boeker, 1997; Dalton, et al., 1999; Forbes, et al., 1999; Golden, et al., 2001). Given this 
level of complexity, current research streams have argued in favor of both, positive (Pearce, 
et al., 1992; Dalton, et al., 1999) and negative (Eisenhardt, et al., 1988; Golden, et al., 2001) 
correlations between diversity and firm performance, depending on the specifications of the 
research settings. Up to now “the black box between diversity and performance [therefore] 
is [still] complex” (Pelled, et al., 1999).  
Board Activity  
Traditionally, studying firm performance within the domain of corporate governance has 
centered on board activity issues. By this, we define the degree to which board members can 
dedicate themselves to their board functions. It is an accepted approach that informal 
relationships, created through more frequent board member interactions, facilitate 
information sharing and problem solving processes (Tuggle, et al., 2010). One could thus 
raise the question whether firm performance is positively influenced by a higher amount of 
board activity. To better understand this issue and to follow the request of enhancing the 
understanding about board processes and firm performance (Zahra, et al., 1989; Pettigrew, 
1992), Tuggle conducted an in-depth research on the nature of board meetings (Tuggle, et 
al., 2010). They characterize board meetings as time-constrained and intensive work 
sessions, in which board members’ attention focus has to be directed in an efficient manner. 
Additionally, they distinguish between formal and informal board meetings, claiming that 
the degree of formality is crucial in influencing board members’ attention and that 
informalities will lead to a more efficient meeting culture. It is therefore suggested that 
greater board activity will positively impact firm performance, as members have more time 
to establish these informal relationships. Also, former studies support this perspective, 
emphasizing the positive influence on the level of trust among board members (Conway, 
1995; Hansen, et al., 2004).  
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Board Compensation  
It is widely acknowledged that board compensation is a crucial issue for firm performance 
(Ang, et al., 2002). Current research, however, places great emphasis on executive 
compensation schemes (Bushman, et al., 1996; Chung, et al., 1996), whereas non-executive 
compensation and especially implications in a two-tier system seem to be less investigated. 
Kosnik defines non-executive directors as board members who have neither been employed 
after, nor at the same time as they serve on its board (Kosnik, 1990). Corporate governance 
reformers and institutional shareholders suggest that giving those non-executive directors a 
financial stake in the firm performance will positively influence their monitoring function on 
management (Perry, 2000). This is supported by agency theory, which predicts that the 
agent’s direction and amount of effort is dictated by performance measures (Waweru, et al., 
2009). It can also be understood in the way that the agent’s effort is focused on those 
dimensions being measured by the performance measurement system (Moers, et al., 2000). 
Therefore, the conclusion has been made that non-executive directors should be 
compensated with some kind of equity-based scheme to align their interests with those of 
the shareholders and thus improve their monitoring function (Perry, 2000). Among others, 
Perry finds empirical support, indicating that such incentive schemes can increase the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance (Perry, 2000). Nevertheless, some contradictory 
studies also exist. According to agency theory, non-executive equity ownership is, expected 
to lead to a more diligent protection of stockholders’ interests (Bacon, et al., 1975 ), Kosnik 
1990 conducted studies on companies’ greenmail decisions and found evidence figuring a 
correlation between non-executive equity interests and the resistance to greenmail (Kosnik, 
1990). Furthermore, Waweru 2009 conducted studies showing no significant influence at all 
between non-executive salaries and the firm’s value (Waweru, et al., 2009).   
Strategic Decision Process 
Separation of ownership and control in the decision-making process of big corporations 
inevitably creates conflicts of interests (Marris, 1964). This is especially important with 
respect to the time horizon of decisions - in particular in case the interests of executing and 
owning party diverge. Strategic decisions, which typically require long-term orientation, are 
a highly interesting field of research in this context. It has long been questioned how outside 
directors’ contribution to the strategic decision-making process has an impact on firm 
performance. Agency theory and analysts suggest that executives’ interests are more short-
time oriented and risk-averse when it comes to long-term investments (Baysinger, et al., 
1991). Non-executives, in turn, are expected to promote strategic long-term decisions that 
are in line with stockholders’ interests (Kosnik, 1990). As a result, this traditional view would 
suggest that a high involvement of the supervisory board in strategic decision-making should 
benefit the company in the long run, and hence yield a positive effect on its financial 
performance. Contradicting this traditional view, some more recent studies imply that under 
certain limitations, the amount of executives may positively correlate with formulating 
effective strategic decisions. This counterintuitive finding is supported amongst others by 
Baysinger et al. 1991, who investigated how outside directors influence corporate R&D 
decisions (Baysinger, et al., 1991). Their findings support earlier studies by Hill and Snell 
(1988), who found the same correlation. These results suggest that, although the 
involvement of non-executive board members in the strategic decision process generally 
seems to play an important role for firm performance, factors such as compensation 
schemes and control mechanisms seem to be a crucial trigger in this context and can highly 
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influence behavior to act against the theoretically predicted behavior patterns (Baysinger, et 
al., 1991; Hayes, et al., 2007).  
Independence  
Independence of board members constitutes a crucial element in the decision-making 
process of a firm. As for the one-tier system independence is defined as a structural 
character, measured by the proportion of outside directors (Golden, et al., 2001). Although 
there has been much research on this topic for decades, evidence of systematic performance 
effects is still missing (He, et al., 2011). Dalton et al. 1998 provide a comprehensive overview 
of the theoretical approach and the different schools dealing with the relationship of 
independence and firm performance. According to their research, two major schools have to 
be consulted, being Agency and Stewardship Theory. Each of these claims that different 
amounts of independence positively influence firm performance (Dalton, et al., 1998). 
Agency Theory suggests that a separation of ownership and control will generally lead to 
actions of self-interest by the controlling party. It therefore draws the conclusion that 
effective boards are those with a large number of outside directors as their temptation to 
follow these behavioral patterns is lower (Dalton, et al., 1998). Studies providing empirical 
support for this assumption are for instance Ezzamel and Watson (1993), Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) and Pearce et al. (1992). In contrast, Stewardship Theory expresses a general 
trust in the controlling party. It argues that control should be centralized in the hands of 
management, as they possess the deepest comprehension of the business. Researchers in 
favor of Stewardship Theory argue therefore that an increase in the proportion of inside 
directors will lead to better firm performance (Dalton, et al., 1998). Empirical support for this 
thesis can be found for example in the studies of Kesner (1987) and Vance (1964, 1978). 
Besides these two schools there exists empirical evidence showing no correlation between 
independence and firm performance at all. Daily and Dalton (1992), and Dalton et al., (1998) 
are important representatives of this perspective.    
 
The existing literature is dominated by an emphasis on studying these five board 
characteristics and their performance effects in the corporate governance structure of the 
one-tier system. Monistic and dualistic board systems, however, show a wide range of 
differences, offering new interesting perspectives for research on board effectiveness. The 
most important distinction thereby lies in the clear separation of control and management in 
the dualistic system, which in a company’s day to day business may have positive and 
negative implications alike. On the one hand it potentially increases protection of 
stakeholder interests, on the other it may lead to problems of information asymmetries 
between supervisory boards and management boards, structural weaknesses and more 
complicated decision making processes. In light of the present research question, however, 
the distinction between control and management in the two-tier system provides a clear 
advantage, as it facilitates the separation between executive and non-executive board 
members in the experimental setting. Whereas this distinction often imposes problems in a 
one-tier system testing, it is naturally given in the two-tier system. We therefore propose 
that analyzing board characteristics and their effects on firm performance in a two-tier 
system is an especially favorable approach and will, under certain conditions, enable a more 
refined picture and a reduction of potential measurement errors. Since there are no explicit 
empirical studies in this context so far, we want to shed light on this issue by testing the five 
above-explained board characteristics explicitly in dualistic corporate governance structures. 
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Doing so, we not only search to enrich the present understanding of performance and board 
work influence, but also try to open the way for a better setting of measurement in this field.   
DATA AND METHODS 
This study is part of a larger multidisciplinary project on supervisory boards in Germany and 
Austria. The setting for that study was represented by the Top 500 (by revenue) companies 
in Germany and Austria. We used a questionnaire-based research method designed to 
approach the incumbent chairmen of these boards in order to get the most accurate data 
available. We designed a survey to gather information on the nature and composition of 
supervisory boards, along the dimensions suggested different and complementary literature 
streams including strategic, leadership, governance and law. Performance measures were 
obtained by computing an average ROA over a three year period. ROA is widely used as a 
measure of performance, and has been used in other studies in the field of corporate 
governance. We have further divided the industry by performance (Grant, 2008) into groups 
to equalize the effect of different capital intensity of industries. Therefore, in the present 
study we aimed to leverage on a broader effort and formulate hypothesis to be tested on an 
existing proprietary database.  
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